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Fatcat
0
quote:

DeZwarteRidder schreef op 25 november 2016 19:26:

[...]

Er is dus een duidelijk verlies geleden in okt.
NAV p/a is inderdaad van $20.05 naar $19.66 gegaan, $0.39 p/a.

Dit lijkt veel voor een maand, maar dit is een lichtelijk vertroebeld beeld van de werkelijke resultaten, die wederom een zeer stabiele maand achter de rug hebben.

Zoals je kunt zien is het aantal shares outstanding toegenomen met 0.8m, waarvan er 0.7m van de april-opties zijn. Daarnaast is er dividend uitgekeerd van 0.1675.

Tot april zal een hogere koers leiden tot een lagere NAV door de april-opties.
Bij een koers van $15 komen er 4.2m bij, bij een koers van $20 komen er 6,25m bij.

De totale waarde van alle bezittingen is van $1,946.3 naar $1,924.7 gegaan waarvan er 0.1675 * 91.6 = 15,34M aan dividend.

Het punt van interesse vindt ik de enorme geldberg, die waarschijnlijk door het aflopen van de 1.0 CLO's heel flink aan het groeien is. Wat gaan ze hier mee doen? Aandeleninkoop, jubileumdividend(Na de april-expiratie uiteraard, gratis geld voor mgmt.) misschien? Een grote geldberg lijkt mij in ieder geval zeer positief voor de aandeelhouder.

DeZwarteRidder
0
quote:

Fatcat schreef op 27 november 2016 14:48:

[...]
NAV p/a is inderdaad van $20.05 naar $19.66 gegaan, $0.39 p/a.
Dit lijkt veel voor een maand, maar dit is een lichtelijk vertroebeld beeld van de werkelijke resultaten, die wederom een zeer stabiele maand achter de rug hebben.

Zoals je kunt zien is het aantal shares outstanding toegenomen met 0.8m, waarvan er 0.7m van de april-opties zijn. Daarnaast is er dividend uitgekeerd van 0.1675.

Tot april zal een hogere koers leiden tot een lagere NAV door de april-opties.
Bij een koers van $15 komen er 4.2m bij, bij een koers van $20 komen er 6,25m bij.
De totale waarde van alle bezittingen is van $1,946.3 naar $1,924.7 gegaan waarvan er 0.1675 * 91.6 = 15,34M aan dividend.

Het punt van interesse vindt ik de enorme geldberg, die waarschijnlijk door het aflopen van de 1.0 CLO's heel flink aan het groeien is. Wat gaan ze hier mee doen? Aandeleninkoop, jubileumdividend(Na de april-expiratie uiteraard, gratis geld voor mgmt.) misschien? Een grote geldberg lijkt mij in ieder geval zeer positief voor de aandeelhouder.
Ze gaan zich duidelijk richten op het inkopen van aandelen, want ze willen de koers zo ver mogelijk boven de 10 krijgen, vanwege de geblokkeerde opties.
DeZwarteRidder
0
quote:

Fatcat schreef op 1 december 2016 08:38:

Interview met de boefjes
www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2016...
Je link werkt niet:
-----------------------------------------------
The past few years have been tough on most hedge fund managers, but not on Reade Griffith.

Sitting in a meeting room of the London offices of his Tetragon Financial, Griffith is charged up. He says he can’t wait to get up every morning at 6 a.m. and scour the news for European stock bargains in the post-Brexit environment. “You’ve got to be on top of it. You’ve got to be here close to it. You can’t do this from New York,” says he. “I am excited.”

Please excuse Griffith for his giddy enthusiasm, but when it comes to business comebacks, his has been remarkable. During the financial crisis, Griffith’s $7 billion Polygon hedge fund lost half of its assets. To make matters worse, the biggest shareholder of Griffith’s Tetragon Financial, billionaire hedge fund manager Leon Cooperman, waged a four-year litigation-fueled jihad accusing Griffith of looting the closed-end fund through self-dealing. The media, including FORBES, piled on, calling Griffith “a poster boy for what’s wrong with hedge funds.”

But instead of folding up and retreating, Griffith dug in and, working with longtime partner Paddy Dear, reorganized his Polygon fund around its holding company parent,Tetragon. The idea was to take advantage of the massive deleveraging globally to buy up on the cheap other asset managers, ranging from a real estate investment firm to a private equity group focused on U.K. infrastructure to a collateralized-loan-obligation manager. The result has been a miraculous revival of Griffith’s funds, as assets swelled from $3 billion under management in 2009 to $19 billion today.

Drastic operating changes were in order. Griffith ditched his multistrategy, single-fund approach in favor of numerous funds with different, more focused objectives and investment horizons. Backstopping them all is his publicly traded closed-end fund, Tetragon Financial, providing permanent capital. Today the Cooperman brawl is a faint memory, and the market gods have favored Griffith’s funds. His European-equities hedge fund is up 4.7% in 2016 and 11.4% annualized since inception in 2011. Tetragon’s stock has returned 8% annually since its 2007 IPO and 19% annually in the past five years–although it trades at a steep 45% discount to its net asset value. “You can’t do this without being thick-skinned,” says Griffith, a former Marine. “It’s never that bad, nobody is shooting at me.”

GRIFFITH’S STEELY RESOLVE is the product of a middle-class Midwestern upbringing and a Harvard education, paid for by a four-year stint in the U.S. Marine Corps. After a tour of duty as an intelligence officer in Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm, he retired as a captain in 1991 and headed to Harvard Law School. From there he went to Goldman Sachs’ arbitrage desk and eventually found himself under the tutelage of billionaire Ken Griffin’s Citadel in 1998. Griffith started Citadel’s European operation in London and helped turn the event-driven group into one of the fund’s biggest businesses.
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In 2002 Griffith started his own hedge fund firm, Polygon Investment Partners, with the idea of setting up a single fund with several uncorrelated strategies. He teamed up with Dear, a UBS banker, who ran the business. Griffith became one of London’s most prominent money men, running Polygon’s global stock portfolio and waging high-profile activist battles against European boards. As an offshoot of Polygon, Griffith and Dear also started Tetragon, a $1 billion closed-end fund focused on bank loans. Total assets grew to $8 billion. Tetragon went public in 2007 in Amsterdam, just as global markets were soaring.

But when markets began unraveling a year later and Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, Polygon was caught overleveraged. It turned out that its “uncorrelated” strategies weren’t uncorrelated at all. The fund lost half its value, and to limit more fire-sale selling, Griffith and Dear exercised partnership provisions that locked money in the hedge fund just as many of its limited partners were demanding it back. To make matters worse, Griffith and Dear controlled an investment partnership that collected $329 million in incentive fees as Tetragon’s credit portfolio recovered.

DeZwarteRidder
0
Continued from page 2

“Once you get to a certain size, if you mess up they are going to roast you alive,” Griffith says. “We had a bad 2008. Do I deserve some criticisms for that? Of course I do.”

Amid the wreckage, Griffith and Dear decided to hit the reset button. The duo would now back multiple funds. Griffith would focus on European equities, and he managed to raise $100 million in 2009 for a new and improved Polygon hedge fund and a separate Polygon convertible bond fund. Griffith and Dear still had Tetragon, with its portfolio of bank loans. So they used Tetragon to buy a small collateralized-loan manager from a distressed French bank. In addition to its investments in bank loans and other credit securities, what emerged at Tetragon was an investment holding company that owned and invested in five different asset managers.

Not everyone was happy with Griffith and Dear’s maneuverings. Cooperman’s Omega Advisors hedge fund bought up a 10% stake of Tetragon, and in 2010 he began writing angry public letters to the board claiming mismanagement. Cooperman filed a lawsuit in Manhattan’s federal court in 2013 and moved the battle to CNBC, saying that “Tetragon management and board members should be barred from ever being associated with or running a public company.”

Cooperman’s antics were an annoyance, but Harvard Law-trained Griffith was confident that his fund hadn’t crossed any contractual lines. In 2014 Cooperman’s lawsuit was thrown out by a federal judge for failing to state a claim. “I have nothing bad to say about the guy except he made it difficult for us for a while,” Griffith says. These days Cooperman, still a major Tetragon shareholder, is recommending its stock.

GRIFFITH’S BOOTS-ON-THE-GROUND multifund strategy has one big advantage. He has an insider’s understanding of the peculiarities of international securities law and business practices. Last year, for example, his Polygon fund began to build up a stake in German machine-tool maker DMG Mori Seiki after its Japanese partner, which already owned 25%, made a bid for the rest of its shares. Griffith decided to piggyback the Japanese, figuring that DMG Mori Seiki was a European operation on the cusp of serious growth. For months Griffith waited as the Japanese company ownership rose from 25% to 50%, giving it control of DMG Mori Seiki’s board, and then to 75%, allowing it to share DMG Mori Seiki’s balance sheet in a tax-efficient way. Almost as if it were a passive version of greenmail in slow motion, Griffith and billionaire Paul Singer’s Elliott Management hedge fund played the same game, buying up stock and then finally agreeing to sell their shares as the Japanese bid up the price. Griffith scored a 70% profit.

Today Griffith maintains that Europe offers value investors a smorgasbord of opportunities, including more DMG Mori Seiki-type situations. He says many companies have yet to fix their balance sheets, and there has been a sharp reduction in both sell-side research and institutional ownership of smaller companies.
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Last year, for example, in a clever risk-arb-inspired ploy, Griffith used Tetragon’s balance sheet to make a quick profit effectively trading into a U.K. asset-manager feeding frenzy among big private equity firms. Griffith approached London asset manager Ashcourt Rowan and agreed to buy a big chunk of it to finance its purchase of another asset manager, which Griffith believed would make Ashcourt attractive to PE buyers. Sure enough, a bidding war resulted in Ashcourt Rowan being acquired, giving Tetragon a $25 million profit.

Griffith and Dear’s long-term plans are obvious: Tetragon is rolling up asset managers that it will one day spin off in an IPO. Its CLO manager LCM, which Tetragon purchased in 2010, currently manages $6.2 billion. Another holding, Equitix, which invests in U.K. infrastructure projects such as waste facilities and hospitals, has $2.6 billion in assets. Another promising holding is real estate manager GreenOak, run by three former Morgan Stanley hotshots. “We had plenty of compelling offers, but they didn’t come close with the infrastructure they offered us,” says Sonny Kalsi, cofounder of GreenOak, which now manages $7.1 billion. GreenOak recently invested $600 million for equity in the first new office building on Manhattan’s Park Avenue in 40 years–Citadel is paying a record $300 per square foot to lease its penthouse.
DeZwarteRidder
0
This story appears in the December 20, 2016 issue of Forbes. Subscribe

Continued from page 3

All told Tetragon has invested $230 million in five different managers, and it estimates they are now valued at $400 million.

These days Griffith is bullish on Spain, which he started investing in three years ago, partly through Inmobiliaria Colonial, a leveraged homebuilder. He also pushed GreenOak to buy $400 million of Spanish warehouses, which are now being auctioned at a profit. Griffith considers Spain “peripheral” Europe and thinks Portugal and soon maybe Italy are also ripe for value investors.

Since its 2007 IPO, Tetragon’s net asset value has increased by 12% annually, it holds $462 million in cash, and its shares currently offer a generous 6% yield. Still, Tetragon trades at an embarrassing 45% discount to NAV, which is likely the lingering effect of its troubled past. Griffith recently recruited hedge fund veteran Stephen Prince to run U.S. operations, and Tetragon is aggressively repurchasing shares–some $160 million in the last 12 months.

Says Drew McKnight, a managing director at Fortress, Tetragon’s biggest shareholder, “They’re trying to evolve the company and make more shareholder-friendly moves.”

SEVA
0
quote:

DeZwarteRidder schreef op 14 november 2016 15:27:

[...]

Dat is zeeer verstandig, maar je denkt toch niet dat je dat ook krijgt...???

De ervaring heeft geleerd dat de inkoopprijs vlak bij de koers ligt en dat het nauwelijks zin heeft om aandelen aan te bieden.
Sommige banken werken zelfs niet mee aan het tenderbod: te ingewikkeld!
Koers gisteren €11,90. Tender of geen tender...
SEVA
0
quote:

Met Effekt schreef op 15 november 2016 14:46:

Bedankt voor de reacties. Bij de vorige tender in maart 2014 liep de koers sterk op tot 11.80$ om na de tender (op 10.40$) in te zakken. Achteraf bleek die 11.80$ een goed verkoopmoment, die koers is in de tijd daarna op een kort moment na nooit meer gehaald, ook nu ruim 2.5 jaar later nog steeds niet.
En heeft u ze nog?
[verwijderd]
0
ik heb ze wel getendered op 12,--.
Als ik het goed gelezen heb wordt de 13 december bekend wat de tenderprijs wordt.
Achteraf had ik ze liever nu voor 11,90 verkocht.
SEVA
0
DeZwarteRidder
0
quote:

SEVA schreef op 9 december 2016 13:09:

Ik hou ze gewoon aan. Dividend van +6% en een NAV van rond de 18.
NAV is ca 20.
SEVA
1
quote:

DeZwarteRidder schreef op 9 december 2016 14:07:

[...]

NAV is ca 20.
Ik zie het nu ook zwarte ridder, thx! Nog beter natuurlijk. Trouwens mooi dat jij, fatcat en shaai de stand van zaken hier bespreken! Kijk er altijd naar uit!
Stapelaar
0
Zo staat het er niet want 66% van 6.5 mln is 4.3 mln:

In accordance with the terms of the Offer, the Master Fund has accepted for purchase 4,310,341 TFG non-voting shares at a purchase price of $11.60 per share. The aggregate cost of this purchase is $49,999,955.60, excluding fees and expenses relating to the Offer. A total of 6,538,366 TFG non-voting shares were properly tendered and not withdrawn at the purchase price of $11.60 per share. Because more than $50,000,000 in value of TFG non-voting shares was properly tendered and not properly withdrawn, the Offer was subject to proration pursuant to the terms of the Offer, with appropriate adjustments to avoid purchases of fractional shares. The final proration factor for the Offer is 65.92%, rounded to the second decimal place.

Blijft toch vreemd dat tenderaars die lager hebben ingezet niet 100% worden bediend. Was eerder ook al het geval.
DeZwarteRidder
0
quote:

Stapelaar schreef op 11 december 2016 22:29:

Blijft toch vreemd dat tenderaars die lager hebben ingezet niet 100% worden bediend. Was eerder ook al het geval.
Blijkbaar is dit hun 'modified Dutch auction'.
shaai
0
quote:

Stapelaar schreef op 11 december 2016 22:29:

Zo staat het er niet want 66% van 6.5 mln is 4.3 mln:

In accordance with the terms of the Offer, the Master Fund has accepted for purchase 4,310,341 TFG non-voting shares at a purchase price of $11.60 per share. The aggregate cost of this purchase is $49,999,955.60, excluding fees and expenses relating to the Offer. A total of 6,538,366 TFG non-voting shares were properly tendered and not withdrawn at the purchase price of $11.60 per share. Because more than $50,000,000 in value of TFG non-voting shares was properly tendered and not properly withdrawn, the Offer was subject to proration pursuant to the terms of the Offer, with appropriate adjustments to avoid purchases of fractional shares. The final proration factor for the Offer is 65.92%, rounded to the second decimal place.

Blijft toch vreemd dat tenderaars die lager hebben ingezet niet 100% worden bediend. Was eerder ook al het geval.
je hebt gelijk, ik had niet goed gekeken, mijn 'meen ik' was dan ook mijn disclaimer voor t slechte lezen.

Maar idd, ook omdat ik het ook onlogisch vind.
Fatcat
0
quote:

SEVA schreef op 19 december 2016 11:36:

Bied €12,02 Laat 12,89...
April komt natuurlijk wel rap dichterbij. Misschien vinden de boefjes het nu wel eens tijd dat de koers fors boven de expiratie-prijs van $10 komt te liggen.

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Vertraagd 19 apr 2024 17:38
Koers 9,660
Verschil 0,000 (0,00%)
Hoog 9,780
Laag 9,660
Volume 4.532
Volume gemiddeld 8.608
Volume gisteren 17.363

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