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Offer Document Dated [●] [●] 2010

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flosz schreef:

On November 30, 2010, the Offeror and Crucell entered into a supplementary addendum to the Merger Agreement (the
“Supplementary Addendum”). Pursuant to the Supplementary Addendum, the Offeror and Crucell agreed to confirm on November
30, 2010 that:
? Crucell is in the process of implementing remedial action to rectify the root cause in order to prevent the
contamination that occurred at Crucell’s Shingal facility in Korea on or about August 7, 2010 and September 27,
2010 (the “Korea Contamination”) from continuing to occur and to test the efficacy of such remedial action;

? Crucell has determined that the immediate operational and financial impact of the Korea Contamination to Crucell is
a one-time €22.8 million inventory provision for Quinvaxem® stock, as provided in Crucell’s financial results for
the third fiscal quarter of 2010, which impact the Offeror and Crucell acknowledged would not alone constitute a
Material Adverse Effect;

? Crucell has acknowledged that the ot...
Ook voor een jurist taaie kost. De hier gegeven overeenstemming tussen partijen inzake de interpretatie van material adverse effect is voor mij een novum die mij zorgen baart.

In dit kader zij gewezen op de operational risks als omschreven bij de totstandkoming van het belang van J&J in CRX in 2009 te weten:

Supply interruptions, product recalls or inventory losses caused by unforeseen events such as
manufacturing or distribution interruptions or regulatory actions, may reduce sales, delay the launch of
new products and adversely affect our operating results and financial condition.
Our products are manufactured and distributed using technically complex processes requiring specialized
facilities, highly specific raw materials and other production constraints. The complexity of these
processes as well as strict Group and government standards for the manufacture of our products may
expose us to risks affecting our production process. Defects in the manufacturing process, including
equipment malfunction, labour problems, regulatory action, power outages, natural disasters and
environmental factors may all affect production output. The EU regulation (EC 1907/2006, REACH),
requiring registration of all chemical materials by us and our suppliers, may cause supply interruptions
of raw materials that may in turn cause production delays if we need to change our sources of certain raw
materials or marketing delays due to new validation activities to demonstrate similarities, or differences
11
in comparability studies between old and new suppliers. Our vaccine products in particular are subject
to the risks of manufacturing problems and inventory loss because of the difficulties inherent in the
manufacture of biological materials, whether in our own facilities or in the facilities of our suppliers.
Vaccine components cannot be sterilized nor can preservatives be added to the manufactured vaccine.
Contamination of our products could result in the loss of entire batches of finished vaccine, which could
lead to lost sales, damage to customer relations, a significant outlay of time and money to investigate the
cause of the contamination and possibly a costly product recall if contaminated vaccines have already
been shipped to customers. A disruption in the supply of certain key products or our failure to accurately
predict the demand for those products could have a material adverse effect on our results.
We rely on a separate facility for the manufacture of each of our products. The marketing and regulatory
authorization of biological products, in particular vaccines, is strongly linked to the production facility
and equipment that are used to manufacture those products. If any event occurs that interrupts production
at one of our facilities, we may have to transfer production to a new site, which would be costly and time
consuming. Because of the short shelf life of biological products, our existing stocks of product may not
be sufficient to supply our customers during such a transition period. For example, our manufacturing
facility in South Korea is our sole production source of the Quinvaxem vaccine. As such, we are
vulnerable to any event that interrupts, reduces or slows production of Quinvaxem at that facility. We
intend to relocate our Quinvaxem operations to another site in South Korea and preparations for such a
move are ongoing. The relocation of the Quinvaxem operations is a complex process, which includes
the inherent risk of the new facility not coming online before the old one has shut down. We agreed on
the time line and conditions of this relocation with parties involved, enabling a smooth transition to the
new production facility; however, there can be no assurance that there will be no delay in the transition
process.
flosz
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Leiden, December 8 2010

DEAR Crucell Shareholder,

On December 8, 2010, Johnson & Johnson, through the Offeror, launched a cash offer for all issued and
outstanding ordinary shares, including all American depositary shares (each representing one ordinary share)
of Crucell (the Offer, as more fully defined above under Important Information).
The Offer represents a historic moment in the history of Crucell and presents an important choice to our
Shareholders.
We find it extremely important to share with you our views and considerations in this Circular and at the
upcoming extraordinary meetings of Shareholders. We take our relationship with our Shareholders very
seriously and appreciate the interest shown by them in the proposed transaction.
In this Circular and during these meetings, you will, among other things, be informed about the Offer and, in
connection therewith, the Governance Resolutions to be adopted at the Offer EGM. You will also be informed
about the Asset Sale and, in connection therewith, the Proxies to be granted to allow Johnson & Johnson or its
designees to vote at the Post Offer EGM in favour of the Post Offer EGM Resolution. This Circular also
provides information regarding the background of the Offer as well as the Offer’s financial and strategic
merits.
The Crucell Management Board and the Crucell Supervisory Board fully and unanimously support the Offer.
The Crucell Boards believe the Offer is in the best interest of Crucell and its stakeholders, including its
Shareholders, partners, employees, patients and customers, and unanimously recommend that the
Shareholders accept the Offer and tender their Shares pursuant to the Offer and, in connection therewith,
adopt the Governance Resolutions and grant Proxies in respect of all of their Shares to the Offeror. The works
council of Crucell Holland B.V. has rendered positive advice in respect of the intended support,
recommendation and execution by the Crucell Management Board and the Crucell Supervisory Board of the
Offer, the Governance Resolutions to be adopted at the Offer EGM, the Asset Sale and the Post Offer EGM
Resolution to be adopted at the Post Offer EGM.
As you will notice from the process described herein, the Crucell Management Board and the Crucell
Supervisory Board have given this Offer careful and extensive consideration. In this Circular we have
summarised how we came to our recommendation.

Yours sincerely,
Ronald Brus
President and Chief Executive Officer
Jan P. Oosterveld
Chairman of the Crucell Supervisory Board
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CERTAIN ARRANGEMENTS
During discussions leading up to the execution of the Merger Agreement, Crucell negotiated certain terms,
conditions and other aspects of the Offer in order to be able to safeguard the interests of all of its
Shareholders, including the interests of Shareholders not tendering their Shares under the Offer. Such terms,
conditions and other aspects of the Offer include the following:
• Exclusivity and the possibility to explore Potential Superior Offers. The terms of the Merger
Agreement give Crucell the ability to consider and respond, under certain circumstances specified in
the Merger Agreement, to an unsolicited, bona fide written proposal for a business combination from a
third party and, subject to the terms and conditions, of the Merger Agreement, to explore Potential
Superior Offers.
• Superior Offers and the Crucell Boards’ Ability to Withdraw or Change its Recommendation (i.e. a
fiduciary out). The Crucell Boards’ ability under the Merger Agreement to withdraw or modify its
recommendation in favour of the Offer under certain circumstances, including its ability to terminate
the Merger Agreement in connection with a Superior Offer, subject to payment of a termination fee of
EUR 20,232,000. See section 7.25.9 of the Offer Document.
For a more detailed description of the exclusivity and Superior Offer provisions, see section 7.25.9 of
the Offer Document.
• Reasonableness of Termination Fee. The Crucell Boards’ determination that the termination fee
payable by Crucell to the Offeror in the event of certain termination events under the Merger
Agreement is within the customary range of termination fees for transactions of this type.
• Negotiations with Johnson & Johnson. The course of negotiations between Crucell and Johnson &
Johnson and improvements to the terms of the Merger Agreement in connection with those
negotiations, and the Crucell Boards’ belief based on these negotiations that this was the highest price
per Share that Johnson & Johnson was willing to pay and that these were the most favourable terms to
Crucell to which Johnson & Johnson was willing to agree.
• Certainty of Post Closing Restructuring Alternatives. The Minority Cash Exit provided for in the
Business Purchase Agreement guarantees payment to the then-existing minority Shareholders of a cash
amount per Share equal to the Offer Price, without interest and subject to any applicable dividend
withholding or other tax.
Extension of Offer. The fact that the Offeror is required to extend the Acceptance Period beyond the
expiry of the initial Acceptance Period if certain Offer Conditions are not satisfied or waived prior to
the Long-Stop Date.
• Ability of Shareholders to Sell Shares in and after the Subsequent Offering Period. Under the Merger
Agreement, Johnson & Johnson has committed to permit a Subsequent Offering Period if the Offer is
declared unconditional. In addition, Johnson & Johnson has agreed with Crucell to use its
commercially reasonable efforts to, subject to required regulatory clearance if applicable, acquire
Shares at a price up to the Offer Price through market purchases at Euronext Amsterdam after the
Subsequent Offering Period in order to provide liquidity to then existing minority Shareholders in
advance of the Minority Cash Exit, which, if pursued, will be announced in the Netherlands and under
Dutch law in due time.
• Standstill and Drag-Along. Johnson & Johnson is subject to a standstill obligation under the
Shareholder Agreement (see section 7.26.2 of the Offer Document). This standstill obligation has been
waived by Crucell in relation to Shares acquired pursuant to the Offer, but otherwise remains in full
force and effect. In addition, the drag-along right under the Shareholder Agreement remains in full
force and effect and, accordingly, if Crucell receives a bona fide public offer from a third party and
(i) the Crucell Boards have endorsed, approved, recommended or otherwise supported such public
offer, (ii) the holders of at least 70% of the issued and outstanding Shares (including those held by
Johnson & Johnson and/or its affiliates) have tendered their Shares to the third party in connection with
such public offer and (iii) JHC and/or any of its affiliates do not have a bona fide matching (x) counter
public offer to the Shareholders or (y) other proposal involving the acquisition by a third party of more
than 30% of the Shares or assets pending, JHC and its affiliates shall agree to tender and sell all their
shares in such public offer.
• Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests. Following completion of the Offer, the Crucell
Supervisory Board will consist of nine individuals designated by Johnson & Johnson and two
individuals, who currently serve on the Crucell Supervisory Board and meet the criteria for
independence set out in best practices III.2.2 of the Dutch corporate governance code, who will act as
independent members of the Crucell Supervisory Board (the Continuing Crucell Directors) until such
time as the Post Closing Restructuring following the Offer has been finalised and, as a result of such
Post Closing Restructuring, no minority Shareholder holds an equity interest in Crucell. In their
position as members of the Crucell Supervisory Board during such period, the Continuing Crucell
Directors will monitor and protect the interests of all the Company’s stakeholders, including in
particular monitoring the interests of any minority Shareholders. If after the Unconditional Date (i) the
Post Closing Restructuring then proposed to be taken differs materially from a compulsory acquisition
procedure (uitkoopprocedure) in accordance with article 2:92a or 2:201a of the DCC or the takeover
buy-out procedures in accordance with article 2:359c of the DCC or from the Business Purchase
Agreement or (ii) in any other circumstance, Crucell proposes to enter into a transaction or take any
action (x) that would reasonably be expected to have a material and adverse effect on any minority
Shareholders or (y) with respect to which all other members of the Crucell Supervisory Board would
have a conflict of interest under applicable law, then the affirmative vote of each Continuing Crucell
Director will be required prior to implementing any such

The whole shebang via
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flosz
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Cleary goes Dutch for Crucell

Cross-border transactions involving Dutch and U.S. companies don't happen very often, and Dutch takeover law is complex. So when one does occur, it is "always intrinsically interesting," says Daniel S. Sternberg, a partner at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, who advised Dutch vaccine maker Crucell NV on its agreement to be acquired by Johnson & Johnson for $2.4 billion.
Cleary is Crucell's principal U.S. counsel for Securities and Exchange Commission reporting requirements, but when the J&J offer arose, Sternberg, who is based in New York, stepped in, with an assist from partners Pierre-Marie Boury and James Duncan. Sternberg worked on a similar Dutch-U.S. transaction in 2004, when he represented New Skies Satellites NV in its sale to Blackstone Group LP.
Under Dutch law, an acquirer must own 95% of the target's shares before it can initiate a statutory buyout of the remaining shares. But getting that 95% "can be a challenge," Sternberg says. Sternberg advised New Skies to structure the transaction as an asset sale to a Blackstone affiliate.

The Crucell deal combines a takeover offer with the possibility of an asset purchase. If New Brunswick, N.J.-based Johnson & Johnson, which already owns about 18% of Crucell, is able to get to 80% ownership, but less than 95%, it will attempt to acquire the business through an asset purchase as long as certain conditions are met.
"For me it's been fun because I had the chance to see the corporate engineering evolve," Sternberg says.
Crucell's board turned to Allen & Overy LLP partner Tim Stevens and of counsel Johan Kleyn, both of whom are based in the Netherlands. For financial advice, the company tapped Lazard's Alexis de Rosnay, vice chairman of Lazard International; Wouter Han, head of Lazard's Benelux business; and Nicolas Serandour. De Rosnay, who focuses on healthcare and cross-border deals, worked on GlaxoSmithKline plc's acquisition of Stiefel Laboratories Inc. last year.
Crucell was also advised by Barclays Capital's Andrew Burch and Maarten de Jong.
Johnson & Johnson stuck with its longtime legal adviser, Damien Zoubek, a partner at Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP. Zoubek represented J&J on its acquisition of San Jose, Calif., cerebral arterial catheter maker Micrus Endovascular Corp. for $480 million in July, and on its May purchase of Cougar Biotechnology Inc. for about $970 million in cash. He also worked on Johnson & Johnson's July 2009 agreement to buy an 18.4% stake in Irish drug developer Elan Corp. plc for $1 billion, as well as on the deal to buy Mentor Corp.
Cravath's Robert Townsend III also worked on the deal. Townsend helped advise Johnson & Johnson in its acquisitions of Mentor and Israel's Omrix Biopharmaceuticals Ltd. in 2008.
J&J also sought legal advice from NautaDutilh NV's Christiaan de Brauw. The company used its own M&A team, led by Tom Heyman and Patrick Verheyen.
www.thedeal.com/newsweekly/dealmaker....
Bijlage:
flosz
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quote:

flosz schreef:

OPINION OF BARCLAYS CAPITAL
BARCLAYS CAPITAL OPINION DATED OCTOBER 5, 2010
October 5, 2010
Supervisory Board of Directors (the “Supervisory Board”)
Crucell NV
Archimedesweg 4-6
Leiden 2301 CA Netherlands
Management Board of Directors (the “Management Board”, together with the Supervisory Board, the “Boards”)
Crucell NV
Archimedesweg 4-6
Leiden 2301 CA Netherlands


Members of Boards:

We understand that Crucell NV (the “Company”) and Cilag Holding AG (the “Offeror”), an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson (“J&J”), have reached agreement on the terms of a public offer to be made by the Offeror for all the issued and to be issued ordinary shares of the Company not already owned by J&J and its affiliates (the “Company Ordinary Shares”), including all Company Ordinary Shares represented by the American Depositary Shares of the Company (the “Company ADSs” together with Company Ordinary Shares, the “Company Shares”) (such offer being the “Offer”). We understand that the J&J and its affiliates already own 17.9% of the issued share capital of the Company. Pursuant to the terms of the Offer, the Offeror will offer an amount in cash equal to €24.75 per Company Share (the “Offer Consideration”). We understand that holders of the Company ADSs will be paid, in respect of each Company ADS, the U.S. equivalent of €24.75, calculated by using the spot market exchange rate for the U.S. Dollar against the Euro on the date on which funds are received by the paying agent to pay for Company ADSs upon completion of the Offer. The terms and conditions of the Offer are set forth in more detail in the Merger Agreement between the Company and the Offeror (the “Merger Agreement”). The Merger Agreement provides that following the closing of the Offer, as one of various possible post-Offer restructurings, the business of the Company may be sold to the Offeror or an affiliate of the Offeror (the "Asset Sale"; the Asset Sale together with the Offer, the “Proposed Transaction”) pursuant to a business purchase agreement substantially in the form attached to the Merger Agreement as Schedule G (the "Business Purchase Agreement", and together with the Merger Agreement, the "Agreements"). Pursuant to the terms of the Business Purchase Agreement, the Offeror will pay to the Company an aggregate amount equal to the product of (x) the Offer Consideration and (y) the total number of Company Shares issued and outstanding immediately prior to completion of such asset sale (the “Purchase Price"). The terms and conditions of the Proposed Transaction are set forth in more detail in the Agreements. The summary of the Proposed Transaction set forth above is qualified in its entirety by the terms of the Agreements.

We have been requested by the Boards to render our opinion with respect to (i) the fairness of the Offer Consideration, from a financial point of view, to the holders of the Company Shares (other than J&J and its affiliates) (the “Shareholders”) and (ii) the fairness of the Purchase Price, from a financial point of view, to the Company. We have not been requested to opine as to, and our opinion does not in any manner address, (i) the Company’s underlying business decision to recommend or proceed with the Proposed Transaction; (ii) the likelihood of the consummation of the Proposed Transaction; or (iii) the method or form of payment of any of the Offer Consideration or the Purchase Price. In addition, we express no opinion on, and our opinion does not in any manner address, the fairness of the amount or the nature of any compensation to any officers, directors or employees of any parties to the Proposed Transaction, or any class of such persons, relative to the Offer Consideration to be offered to the Shareholders in the Proposed Transaction or to the Purchase Price payable in the Asset Sale.

In arriving at our opinion, we reviewed and analyzed: (1) a draft of the Merger Agreement dated as of October 5, 2010 including the draft of the form of Business Purchase Agreement attached thereto as Schedule G, and the specific terms of the Proposed Transaction; (2) publicly available information concerning the Company that we believe to be relevant to our analysis, including its Annual Report on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2009 and quarterly reports for the fiscal quarters ended March 31, 2010 and June 30, 2010; (3) financial and operating information with respect to the business, operations and prospects of the Company furnished to us by the Company, including financial projections of the Company prepared by management of the Company; (4) a trading history of the Company Shares from September 16, 2008 to September 16, 2010 and a comparison of that trading history with those of other companies that we deemed relevant; (5) published estimates of independent research analysts with respect to the future financial performance and price targets of the Company; (6) a comparison of the historical financial results and present financial condition of the Company with those of other companies that we deemed relevant; (7) a comparison of the financial terms of the Proposed Transaction with the financial terms of certain other recent transactions that we deemed relevant, and (8) the Company’s existing collaboration agreement with J&J. In addition, we have had discussions with the management of the Company concerning its business, operations, assets, financial condition and prospects and have undertaken such other studies, analyses and investigations as we deemed appropriate.
******************************
Barclays Capital is acting as financial advisor to Crucell in connection with the proposed transaction. As
compensation for its services in connection with the proposed transaction, Crucell paid Barclays Capital a fee
of €0.5 million upon the delivery of Barclays Capital’s opinion and €0.5 million upon execution of the
Merger Agreement. Additional compensation of €9.4 million will be payable as advisory fee on completion of
the proposed transaction, which includes an incentive fee payable to Barclays Capital based on the offer price
received. In addition, Crucell has agreed to reimburse Barclays Capital for expenses incurred in connection
with the proposed transaction and to indemnify Barclays Capital for certain liabilities that may arise out of its
engagement by Crucell and the rendering of Barclays Capital’s opinion. Barclays Capital has performed
various investment banking and financial services for Crucell, Johnson & Johnson and their affiliates in the
past, and is likely to perform such services in the future, and has received, and is likely to receive, customary
fees for such services. Specifically, in the past two years, Barclays Capital has advised Crucell on its strategic
collaboration with JHC, an affiliate of Johnson & Johnson in September 2009 and conducted non-deal road
shows with Crucell management.
P.47 e.o.55
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&&&&&&&&&&&&&&

MEDIOBANCA
Main shareholders:
Silvio enCo. &
Barclays
www.mediobanca.it/documents/Prospetto...
Page 76.
___________
Losse flodders mbt Mediobanca:
www.iex.nl/Forum/Topic/1259248/Last/W...
maxen
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flosz schreef op 12 december 2010 12:48:

******************************
Barclays Capital is acting as financial advisor to Crucell in connection with the proposed transaction. As compensation for its services in connection with the proposed transaction, Crucell paid Barclays Capital a fee of €0.5 million upon the delivery of Barclays Capital’s opinion and €0.5 million upon execution of the Merger Agreement. Additional compensation of €9.4 million will be payable as advisory fee on completion of the proposed transaction, which includes an incentive fee payable to Barclays Capital based on the offer price received. In addition...
Kortom, Barclays heeft, als ' financial advisor' aan zichzelf zijnde, er ook heeeel erg financial belang bij om de deal door te laten gaan. Dit is ongetwijfeld niet typisch voor deze overname alleen, maar maakt natuurlijk geen onafhankelijk advies mogelijk.

Overigens, aandelenbezit van Barclays per 9/30/2010 (NA eerste overname-aankondiging) met 6/30/2010 (VOOR overname-aankondiging):

www.nasdaq.com/asp/holdings.asp?symbo...
BARCLAYS PLC 9/30/2010 156,060
Toename met 154,858
Procentuele toename: >1,000.00%

Ik denk dan wel dat die inkoop van 154,858 VOOR de overname-aankondiging van 17 september heeft plaatsgevonden.
flosz
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flosz schreef:

[quote=flosz]
BARCLAYS CAPITAL OPINION DATED OCTOBER 5, 2010
[/quote]
******************************
Barclays Capital is acting as financial advisor to Crucell in connection with the proposed transaction. As compensation for its services in connection with the proposed transaction, Crucell paid Barclays Capital a fee of €0.5 million upon the delivery of Barclays Capital’s opinion and €0.5 million upon execution of the Merger Agreement. Additional compensation of €9.4 million will be payable as advisory fee on completion of
the proposed transaction, which includes an incentive fee payable to Barclays Capital based on the offer price received. In addition, Crucell has agreed to reimburse Barclays Capital for expenses incurred in connection with the proposed transaction and to indemnify Barclays Capital for certain liabilities that may arise out of its
engagement by Crucell and the rendering of Barclays Capital’s opinion. P.47 e.o.55
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ZAKENBANKEN VERDIENEN DIK AAN BEOORDELING OVERNAMEBOD. 'U VRAAGT, WIJ WAARDEREN EN MEER'
Hoe ondernemingen hun eigen overname verkopen
22 januari 2011
Is een overnamebod wel hoog genoeg? Zakenbankiers laten zich graag inhuren om dat te analyseren. Eventueel willen ze de opdrachtgevers wel naar de mond praten. Als de voorgehouden worst maar vet genoeg is.
Dat leert een snelle analyse van een aantal recente overnames op de Nederlandse beurs.

Eerst de reguliere gang van zaken. Als een bedrijf op het punt staat overgenomen te worden, moet het bestuur de boer op om de aanstaande verkoop te promoten.

Want dat bestuurders een overnamebod al snel de moeite waard vinden is niet vreemd. Ze hebben vaak belang bij de verkoop van hun bedrijf. De overnemende partij paait het bestuur van zijn prooi graag met extra bonussen en mooie vervolgbanen.

Miljoenen lonken
En dus is een onafhankelijk waardering van het bod gewenst. Zakenbanken laten zich graag inhuren voor deze taak. Zij lichten het complete bedrijf door om zo de redelijkheid van een fusie of overname te beoordelen.

De uitkomst van die analyse is meestal voorspelbaar. Het waarderingsrapport geeft de opdrachtgevers gelijk: het bod is redelijk en in het belang van beleggers.

Probleem is dat de opstellers van deze zogenoemde fairness opinie erg veel te winnen hebben bij dat oordeel. Voor het maken van een waarderingsrapport incasseren ze al miljoenen. Maar de buit kan nog groter worden als de overname slaagt. Dan krijgen de rapportschrijvers van de zakenbank in kwestie nog een extra beloning.
Barclay´s spekkoper bij overname Crucell
Het meest pregnante voorbeeld afgelopen tijd valt te noteren bij de geplande overname van biotechbedrijf Crucell door Johnson & Johnson. Flink wat beleggers vonden het bod van J&J te laag en meenden dat het bestuur van Crucell te snel had toegehapt.

De zakenbankiers van Barclays mocht het bod op waarde beoordelen. Daarvoor ontving de bank een half miljoen euro gegarandeerd en een half miljoen onder voorwaarden.

De kassa zou pas echt gaan rinkelen voor de Britse bank als de overname doorgang zou vinden. Dan volgde nog een extra vergoeding van 9,4 miljoen euro. Het oordeel van Barclays over het bod op Crucell: redelijk en evenwichtig.

De miljoenencompensatie ontvangt Barclays voor extra adviesdiensten die het verricht. Want bij een waarderingsrapport blijft het vak niet. Zakenbanken Lazard, MeesPierson of JP Morgan weten naast de fairness opinie nog meer klussen binnen te hengelen. Dat maakt een goede verstandhouding met de opdrachtgevers nog lucratiever.

Welkom steuntje
Veel beursfondsen zijn na de kredietcrisis weer aardig hersteld. Veel banken hebben het nog steeds moeilijk. En dan is het fijn dat het fusie- en overnamespel weer op de wagen is met overnames van bijvoorbeeld Draka, Crucell, Gamma Holding. U vraagt, wij waarderen en meer.
tinyurl.com/48demc7
flosz
2
Waarderingsrapport bij overnames is gekleurd

Het overnamecircus is ’big business’ voor zakenbanken. Die worden erbij gehaald om voor de aandeelhouders vast te stellen of een – al of niet vijandig – bod op hun stukken reëel is. Maar vaak hebben de banken die een dergelijk waarderingsrapport of ’fairness opinie’ opstellen zelf een direct belang bij een overname.

Wie betaalt, bepaalt: de opdrachtgever (lees: de prooi) krijgt de conclusie die het nodig heeft om de overname aan zijn aandeelhouders te verkopen.
Dat blijkt uit een onderzoek dat de Vereniging van Effectenbezitters (VEB) heeft laten uitvoeren naar de onafhankelijkheid van deze ’fairness opinies’. Voor zakenbanken als Lazard, MeesPierson of JP Morgan is de fairness opinie een lucratieve miljoenenmarkt. Maar zo’n extern waarderingsrapport heeft voor de beleggers geen toegevoegde waarde als dit is opgesteld door een niet-onafhankelijke partij. En al helemaal niet als de zakenbank een direct financieel belang heeft bij het slagen van het overnamebod, zo concludeert de VEB.
Beursexits zijn aan de orde van de dag: Draka, Crucell, Gamma Holding, Smit Internationale en Océ.
Hoe weet een belegger of een bod niet te laag is? Elke euro te veel gaat immers ten koste van het toekomstig rendement van de koper. Houdt het bod van Canon op Océ bijvoorbeeld wel voldoende rekening met de mogelijk te behalen schaalvoordelen aan de inkoop- en omzetkant voor de Japanners?
Maar ook de bestuurders van de overnameprooi zijn niet onbevooroordeeld. Vaak heeft de overnemende partij de topman een bestuurszitje in het nieuwe bedrijf toegezegd, anders volgt in de regel een riante exitpremie.
Uit de steekproef blijkt bovendien dat de zakenbanken in het leeuwendeel van de gevallen meeprofiteren als de overname slaagt. Zo heeft Barclays, dat is ingehuurd door het bestuur van Crucell voor het beoordelen van het bod van Johnson & Johnson, veel te winnen. De bank ontvangt 500.000 als de overname doorgaat. Daarbovenop krijgt Barclays nog eens 9,4 miljoen overgemaakt voor geleverde adviesdiensten als de overname slaagt.

Financieel advies
Meer in het algemeen valt op dat de zakenbank die de fairness opinie opstelt, veelal ook andere (advies)diensten aan de onderneming levert, of heeft geleverd. Denk hierbij aan verschaffen van leningen, ander financieel advies of eerder advies bij gedane overnames. Neem Océ. Topman Rokus van Iperen en zijn medebestuurders vroegen ING begin vorig jaar een fairness opinie aan te leveren voor het openbare bod van het Japanse Canon ( 8,60 per aandeel) op de printerfabrikant. Maar ING was al sinds medio 2008 adviseur van Van Iperen en consorten in het kader van het destijds gestart strategische heroriëntatieproces dat uiteindelijk uitmondde in een opgaan in Canon.

’In the picture’
Saillant is eveneens dat de toenmalige president-commissaris van Océ, oud-DSM-topman Peter Elverding, oppercommissaris is van ING. Dat de bank-verzekeraar het sluitstuk van de strategie-evaluatie waarbij het zelf intensief was betrokken (namelijk de overname) onafhankelijk heeft kunnen beoordelen, is volgens de VEB onwaarschijnlijk. Elverding wees tijdens de buitengewone aandeelhoudersvergadering over het Canon-bod vooral op de eigen adviseur van de raad van commissarissen (Lazard) die tot eenzelfde conclusie als ING was gekomen.
Los hiervan willen banken bij de onderneming ’in the picture’ blijven om toekomstige bancaire diensten te leveren. De relatie met de opdrachtgever is vooral van belang – de oorspronkelijke aandeelhouders zijn na gestanddoening van het bod immers vertrokken. De opinies spreken vaak over strikt gescheiden afdelingen, ook wel ’Chinese Walls’, maar de vraag is hoe dik die muren zijn. Het is niet voor niets dat de eerste opinie die aangeeft dat een overname ’unfair’ is nog moet worden geschreven, aldus het onderzoek.
tinyurl.com/46mmqhf
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0
quote:

flosz schreef:

ING-meisjes en jongens duiken in de postzak en gaan tellen…..tot 22 feb.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=sRt3COCdSiw

22e werd inderdaad genoemd op de BAVA. In de documenten staat No later than on the third business day following acceptance closing date. Dat betekent dus op z'n laastst maandag de 21e.
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Toch nog even een heerlijk moment:

Frank van Eerdenburg.

Further to this debate which has Mr. Keyner from the VEB is right to say, in my opinion, and some people sitting around
me too say that the tone of voice in the presentation has changed. You said there has been no miscommunication. But in case of communications
that are always two stations, always -- at least two stations are involved. Mr. Keyner says that he has a different impression than you wanted to -- you wanted to arise.
I think that the tone in which you reacted is absolutely inappropriate and inadmissible, especially for the chairman at a meeting like this. This really, I think, is very painful and this is not the way we needed we should be dealing with each other. And could it possibly be that the sender of the message should have presented things slightly differently.
Many people like me have a completely different idea from these presentations we have heard at other meetings. So don't say -- either you were making another impression at previous meetings or at this one, but one of the two is the case.

29
Jan Pieter Oosterveld - Crucell - Chairman -- Supervisory Board

Okay Sorry I regret having you -- have you -- hearing you react so painfully. I shall talk to Mr. Keyner after the meeting.
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1
In Amerika nu voor het eerst boven het bod: 24,77!

Wellicht toch iets minder een gelopen race dan iedereen denkt, c.q. men ons wil doen denken? Ik krijg goede hoop dat mijn geschreven puts 24,50 maart waardeloos gaan aflopen en dat mijn ouders blij gaan zijn dat ik hun Crucellekes nog maar NIET heb aangeboden.

In mijn achterhoofd houd ik rekening met het bizarre scenario dat van Herk / Deltalloyd nog gaan melden dat zij inderdaad hebben toegezegd dat zij gaan aanmelden, alleen dan voor een andere prijs dan die 24,75. Dan zou Brus erin geslaagd zijn absolute kampioen "stinkende zaken" te worden.
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In Amerika nu voor het eerst boven het bod: 24,77!

Wellicht toch iets minder een gelopen race dan iedereen denkt, c.q. men ons wil doen denken? Ik krijg goede hoop dat mijn geschreven puts 24,50 maart waardeloos gaan aflopen en dat mijn ouders blij gaan zijn dat ik hun Crucellekes nog maar NIET heb aangeboden.

In mijn achterhoofd houd ik rekening met het bizarre scenario dat van Herk / Deltalloyd nog gaan melden dat zij inderdaad hebben toegezegd dat zij gaan aanmelden, alleen dan voor een andere prijs dan die 24,75. Dan zou Brus erin geslaagd zijn absolute kampioen "stinkende zaken" te worden.
[/quote]

Wie weet wordt het toch nog spannend.Ik wil geen valse hoop wekken maar letterlijk heeft van Herk verklaard:

Onroerend Goed Beheer- en Beleggingsmaatschappij A. van Herk B.V. (“Van Herk”) heeft de intentie haar Aandelen aan te melden onder het Bod.

De intentie hebben is nog altijd iets anders dan het werkelijk doen.
We zullen het de komende dagen wel zien

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2
quote:

phar-truc schreef op 16 februari 2011 22:58:

In mijn achterhoofd houd ik rekening met het bizarre scenario dat van Herk / Deltalloyd nog gaan melden dat zij inderdaad hebben toegezegd dat zij gaan aanmelden, alleen dan voor een andere prijs dan die 24,75. Dan zou Brus erin geslaagd zijn absolute kampioen "stinkende zaken" te worden.
Leer mij van Herk kennen: Van Herk meldt netjes aan voor € 24,75 en gaat mede Galapagos aandeelhouder J&J niet foppen. Eventuele extraatjes/tegenprestaties worden bij Galapagos t.z.t. buiten ieders zicht en aandacht, zonder juridische risico's, wel weer glaggestreken: Mocht hij ooit zijn pakket G in een keer tegen een mooie prijs willen weg doen, wie is dan voor hem de geschiktste partij om dit cash af te nemen? Wat mij betreft (toen ook geschreven) was deze move van Van Herk vanaf de BAVA begin december al duidelijk, sindsdien is daar niets in veranderd.

flosz
2
quote:

Kelewan schreef:

Leer mij van Herk kennen: Van Herk meldt netjes aan voor € 24,75 en gaat mede Galapagos aandeelhouder J&J niet foppen. Eventuele extraatjes/tegenprestaties worden bij Galapagos t.z.t. buiten ieders zicht en aandacht, zonder juridische risico's, wel weer glaggestreken: Mocht hij ooit zijn pakket G in een keer tegen een mooie prijs willen weg doen, wie is dan voor hem de geschiktste partij om dit cash af te nemen? Wat mij betreft (toen ook geschreven) was deze move van Van Herk vanaf de BAVA begin december al duidelijk, sindsdien is daar niets in veranderd.

imode.iex.nl/forum/topic.asp?forum=22...

Zo ist en nie anders!
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Dank je Flosz! Waarschijnlijk lees ik hier ook nog omdat ik stiekum niet alleen het aandeel Crucell, maar jullie allemaal mis.
wilb52
0
Maar Genzyme heeft het toch beter voor elkaar!
Nl 74 $ plus nog evt 14
Maakt samen 88 = ca 80% hoger dan de koers VOOR de geruchtenstroom.
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0
Ho,ho de CVR wordt geschat op ca. $2 !!
Maakt $76. Altijd nog leuk meer dan het initiële bod van $69
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